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Abstract—Designing distributed, fast and reliable wireless
consensus protocols is instrumental in enabling mission-critical
decentralized systems, such as robotic networks in the industrial
Internet of Things (IIoT), drone swarms in rescue missions,
and so forth. However, chasing both low-latency and reliability
of consensus protocols is a challenging task. The problem is
aggravated under wireless connectivity that may be slower and
less reliable, compared to wired connections. To tackle this is-
sue, we investigate fundamental relationships between consensus
latency and reliability through the lens of wireless connectiv-
ity, and co-design communication and consensus protocols for
low-latency and reliable decentralized systems. Specifically, we
propose a novel communication-efficient distributed consensus
protocol, termed Random Representative Consensus (R2C), and
show its effectiveness under gossip and broadcast communication
protocols. To this end, we derive a closed-form end-to-end (E2E)
latency expression of the R2C that guarantees a target reliability,
and compare it with a baseline consensus protocol, referred to
as Referendum Consensus (RC). The result show that the R2C
is faster compared to the RC and more reliable compared when
co-designed with the broadcast protocol compared to that with
the gossip protocol.
Index Terms—Distributed consensus, distributed ledger tech-
nology (DLT), Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT), gossip protocol,
broadcast protocol, Internet of Things (IoT).
I. INTRODUCTION
We are currently witnessing an explosive increase of wire-
less endpoints in smart homes, autonomous vehicles, and mod-
ern industrial environments, which warrants a paradigm shift
from centralized and rigid architectures towards decentralized
and flexible systems [1], [2]. For example, cyber-physical sys-
tems (CPSs) in Industry 4.0 wirelessly interconnect a variety
of nodes ranging from mobile devices to sensors and actuators
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Fig. 1. An illustration of our proposed (2) random representative
consensus (R2C) protocol compared to (1) a baseline referendum
consensus (RC) protocol, under (a) gossip and (b) broadcast com-
munication protocols.
in a decentralized manner while enabling real-time mission-
critical control [3], thereby enhancing human and machine
safety in manufacturing, inventory tracking, and self-driving
vehicles [4].
Such decentralized systems enable multiple nodes to carry
out valid control actions in a proper order, taking into
account interactions, malfunctions, and adversarial attacks. We
address this problem by leveraging principles of distributed
ledger technology (DLT), in which every node stores a ledger
containing a consensual sequence of valid control actions. The
candidate actions proposed by multiple nodes are virtually
validated at each node via majority rule, by receiving messages
of local validation from the other validators. Then, the order
of valid actions is determined by a pre-defined consensual
ordering policy, based on each action’s average validation time.
Designing a distributed consensus protocol performing ac-
tion validation and ordering operation is the prime goal of this
paper. Towards supporting mission-critical and real-time tasks
over wireless links, the consensus protocol needs to account
for wireless system characteristics and thereby optimize its
operations under the consensus latency and reliability trade-
off. This raises the following two fundamental questions.
Q1. How does communication affect the trade-off between
consensus latency and reliability?
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2For a fixed number of faulty nodes carrying out adversarial
and malicious actions, a consensus becomes more reliable
when more participating nodes validate actions via consensus.
However, too many validators incur huge communication
overhead, which increases consensus latency, resulting in the
trade-off between consensus latency and reliability.
Q2. How to enable distributed, fast and reliable consensus
under wireless connectivity?
To minimize consensus latency, on the one hand, its con-
sensus protocol should be optimized by adjusting the number
of validators for guaranteeing a target reliability. On the other
hand, the communication protocol of validators should be op-
timized. In other words, these consensus and communication
protocols should be co-designed, under the aforementioned
trade-off between consensus latency and reliability.
In this article, we aim to answer Q1 and Q2 by proposing
a novel distributed consensus protocol, termed Random Rep-
resentative Consensus (R2C). As illustrated in Fig. 1, in the
R2C, only randomly selected representative nodes validate the
consensus process. Furthermore, we aim at a communication-
efficient design, by investigating the R2C implementations
under two different communication protocols: 1) gossip based
R2C wherein a single message is disseminated through multi-
hop communications, and 2) broadcast based R2C in which
every message is disseminated by a single hop.
A key design challenge of the R2C is to obtain the number
of representatives ensuring low-latency and high-reliability,
which varies depending on the employed communication
protocols in general. Thus, we investigate end-to-end (E2E)
latency and reliability of the R2C by deriving their closed-
form expressions for the above-mentioned communication
protocols. The E2E latency measures the delay that an action
experiences between the initiation and completion of its vali-
dation. The reliability is studied in terms of resiliency against
faulty nodes and robustness against missing validators.
Compared to a baseline scheme, referred to as Referendum
Consensus (RC) where all nodes are validators, we show that
the R2C can reach its consensus significantly faster, while
achieving the target reliability requirement, when reliable
direct communication is available between any pair of nodes.
More specifically, we analytically find the minimum number
of validators required for resilient and robust consensus in
the R2C. Moreover, we compare gossip and broadcast com-
munication methods for the RC and R2C, and show that the
broadcast-based R2C achieves the fastest consensus, with a
sufficiently small amount of faulty nodes. Although broad-
casting consumes larger single-hop transmission power than
gossiping, the total energy consumption of each consensus is
minimized under the broadcast-based R2C, thanks to its lowest
consensus latency.
A. Related Work
The problem of reliability and fault tolerance of consensus
protocols has long been studied, mostly under peer-to-peer net-
work architectures with a (relatively) small number of nodes
[5]–[8]. However, recent interest in value transfer applications,
such as crypto-currencies and smart contracts, has triggered a
rapid development of distributed consensus protocols for large-
scale systems with low-latency.
In terms of the scalability and reliability, Blockchain is
one of the most popular and widely-utilized technology for
applications ranging from crypto-currency [9] to distributed
machine learning [10] and drone-aided mobile edge comput-
ing [11]. However, since Blockchain allows permission-less
node participation [9], it may suffer from large consensus
delays (e.g., several minutes-hours) that are ill-suited for
mission-critical and real-time control applications.
From the low-latency perspective, permissioned consen-
sus protocols are gradually emerging as suitable alternatives.
These methods are built on Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT)
algorithms [5], [8] that require exchanging voting information
prior to the consensus process, hindering their scalability. In
view of this, Hashgraph is one compelling algorithm, in which
the consensus is locally carried out at each node without
exchanging voting information [12], thereby achieving its
scalability with low consensus latency.
Nonetheless, most of the aforementioned algorithms pos-
tulate that nodes communicate over fast and reliable wired
links. To support large-scale systems, wireless connectivity
is mandatory in consensus operations, and its impact on
consensus reliability and latency should be carefully examined.
On this account, wireless distributed consensus protocols have
recently been studied in several recent works [10], [11], [13]–
[18]. For instance, a Hashgraph-motivated wireless distributed
consensus protocol has been introduced in [13], in the context
of distributed wireless spectrum access applications. For power
grid applications, an Ethereum-based smart contract and its
operation protocol has been studied in [19].
Yet, most of the preceding works on wireless distributed
consensus protocols are application-specific, and void of clar-
ifying the relationship between wireless communication and
consensus protocol operations. To the best of our knowledge,
this work is the first of its kind that investigates the fundamen-
tals of fast and reliable consensus over wirelessly connected
nodes via communication and consensus co-design.
B. Contributions and Organization
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• We propose a novel communication-efficient distributed
consensus scheme, the R2C (Sec. IV), and compare its
effectiveness with a baseline method, RC (Sec. III).
• We derive the minimum required number of the R2C
validators under the gossip and broadcast communication
protocols, guaranteeing a target resiliency probability
against faulty nodes and a target robustness probability
against missing validators (Propositions 3-4 in Sec. IV-B
and C).
• We derive closed-form E2E latency expressions of the RC
and R2C under the gossip and broadcast protocols, guar-
anteeing a target resiliency and robustness requirement
(Propositions 1-2 in Sec. III-B and Propositions 5-6 in
Sec. IV-D).
• We provide a distributed consensus and wireless commu-
nication co-design guideline, emphasizing that the R2C
3TABLE I
Summary of Notations
Notation Meaning
N , N˜ # of validators in RC and R2C, respectively.
F , F˜ # of faulty nodes in RC and R2C, respectively.
Hik Channel gain from node i to k (∼ CN (0, Pt)).
Rik , R
Distance between node i and k, and any two neighboring
nodes, respectively.
Pt,g , Pt,b
Transmit power utilized at each node in gossip and
broadcast protocols, respectively.
τ Time span of a single time slot.
Lg , Lb E2E latency in RC with gossip and broadcast, respectively.
L˜g , L˜b E2E latency in R2C with gossip and broadcast, respectively.
wi,ζ Dissemination time duration of node i.
α Target resiliency probability.
β, γ Acceptable consensus distortion and target robustnessprobability, respectively.
ζ Target dissemination success probability.
with wireless broadcast is a faster and more reliable
consensus solution for distributed systems when direct
communication is available between the nodes composing
a network. Its effectiveness and feasibility are under-
pinned by both analysis and numerical evaluations (Sec.
V).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Sec. II, we explain the system architecture including network
model and the communication protocols in detail. In Sec. III,
we study the baseline RC, and in Sec. IV we propose the R2C.
In Sec. V, we numerically evaluate the effectiveness of the
RC and R2C under the gossip and broadcast communication
protocols, followed by the conclusion in Sec. VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe the network model and commu-
nication protocols under study. The communication protocol
incorporates two types of message disseminating protocols:
gossiping and broadcasting. Some important notations are
summarized in Table I for the sake of convenient reference.
A. Network and Channel Model
Considering a network consists of a set N of N + 1 static
nodes that are placed in a square grid is sufficient to show the
effectiveness of the proposed consensus protocol and facilitates
tractable analysis. The network under study is assumed to be
permissioned [5], [20], in which each node is aware of the
identities of the other nodes and size of the network. The
nodes can be interpreted as arbitrary network edges ranging
from mobile devices to sensors, actuators, and controllers in
Industry 4.0. The coordinates of the node i, for i ∈ N , are
denoted by (xi, yi), and the distance between the nodes i and k
is thereby given as Rik = Rki =
√
(xi − xk)2 + (yi − yk)2.
For the sake of convenience, we hereafter consider case when√
N + 1 is a positive integer.
The nodes are equipped with wireless transceivers that
utilize equal transmission power Pt, and communicate with the
other nodes over wireless channels. The wireless channels are
assumed to follow the standard path loss model and Rayleigh
fading model [21]. Specifically, the path loss between nodes i
and k is given as
PLdB(Rik) = PLdB(R0) + 10η log10
(
Rik
R0
)
, (1)
where PLdB(R0) is defined as the path loss at the reference
distance R0, λ is the wavelength and η ≥ 2 indicates the
path loss exponent. Furthermore, the multi-path effect on the
channel from node i to node k is characterized by the Rayleigh
fading model. Let Hik be the channel gain from node i to node
k, i 6= k, following the complex normal distribution with zero
mean and variance Pt (i.e., Hik ∼ CN (0, Pt)). We assume that
the channel gains are independently and identically distributed
(i.i.d.). Consequently, when a signal is transmitted from node
i to k with transmit power Pt, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
is represented as
SNRik = 10
−PLdB(R0)10 |Hik|2Pt
Pn
(
R0
Rik
)η
, (2)
where Pn is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) power.
The absolute time is globally synchronized periodically with
GPS [22], [23] and split into time slots of fixed time interval
such that
τ =
M
B log(1 + ρ)
seconds, (3)
where M is the maximum size of message sent by nodes
during the consensus protocol in bits, ρ is the target signal-to-
noise (SNR) of each transmission, and B in Hz denotes the
bandwidth utilized for transmission. An SNR outage occurs if
SNR is below ρ. Since |Hik|2 is exponentially distributed, the
SNR outage probability is given as
ik = 1− exp
(
−10PLdB(R0)10 ρPn
Pt
(
Rik
R0
)η)
. (4)
For each outage event, we consider the type-I hybrid automatic
repeat request (HARQ), where the message transmissions are
repeated until the first success.
B. Communication Protocol
During consensus operations, every node can become either
a message source or its destination. Each message is then
disseminated from a single source to multiple destinations,
according to either the gossip or broadcast communication
protocol, as detailed next.
1) Gossip Protocol: The nodes make use of multi-hop
communication for disseminating messages using the gossip
protocol. Unlike a typical gossip protocol in peer-to-peer wired
networks, the spread of information is constrained by wireless
communication coverage. Thus, we consider a neighbor gossip
protocol, where direct communications are only available
to the nodes located within the coverage of a transmitter.
Specifically, in the network model under study, neighbors
are located R meters apart from each other. Assume that all
transmit nodes including the source and relays utilizes the
same transmit power Pt = Pt,g , which can be fairly small
since we assume communication between neighbors.
42) Broadcast Protocol: Nodes communicates with other
nodes within a single hop in the broadcast protocol, which
means that any pair of nodes can be paired through a wireless
channel. Compared to the gossip protocol, each transmit node
in the broadcast protocol must cover larger areas, and thus, we
assume that the transmission power Pt = Pt,b used by each
node in the broadcast protocol is larger than that of the gossip
protocol, i.e., Pt,b ≥ Pt,g .
Later on, above two communication protocols are co-
designed with the consensus protocols and the consequen-
tial performances are compared. Notice that since we are
considering a permissioned network with static nodes, the
communication protocol that suits better to the given con-
dition, e.g., network size, transmission power, etc., can be
chosen right after the formation of the network. For real world
implementation with more general network environments, such
as network expanding as the number of node increases, the
selection of communication protocol can be done after device
discovering procedure for device-to-device communication
coordination. The decision rule for selecting an appropriate
communication protocol can be designed based on the number
of other device in its communication range learned from the
discovering process.
In the mean time, for the efficient use of radio resources,
we preallocate wiτ seconds of dissemination time duration for
message dissemination by node i ∈ N as a source. Let Wi be
a random variable denoting the number of time slots required
for message dissemination to all destinations from source i.
In both protocols, wi is determined such that
Pr[Wi ≤ wi] ≥ ζ, (5)
for some target dissemination success probability 0 ≤ ζ < 1.
C. Distributed Ledger Architecture
Every node is equipped with a sufficiently large storage
capacity to store a chain of valid actions, namely a distributed
ledger. Throughout the paper, we suppose that the distributed
ledger is a replicated state machine [7] that takes validity of
the proposed actions and their timestamps recorded during
the validation processes as an input, and outputs a series of
valid actions. Note that the distributed ledgers are updated
and synchronized by the consensus protocol. Moreover, we
use cryptographic techniques to prevent fabrication of the
messages and detect corrupted messages. We assume that
the messages contain public-key signatures [24], message
authentication codes [25], and message digests produced by
collision-resistant hash functions [26]. Throughout the paper,
a messageM signed by node i is denoted by [M]i. Note that
a method of signing a digest of a message and appending
it to the raw message is widely used rather than signing the
full message in practice. Thus, the raw message M and the
encrypted digest of M are included in the signed message
[M]i.
III. BASELINE: REFERENDUM CONSENSUS (RC)
In this section, we introduce our baseline scheme, the
referendum consensus (RC) protocol, which is named after a
political term referendum. The RC aims to reach two kinds of
consensual decisions on the validity of proposed actions and
the order of valid actions, rooted in the Practical Byzantine
Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [8] and a permissioned DLT [12],
respectively. To this end, all nodes in the RC become validators
and participate in the consensus process, as detailed next.
In the RC, each node plays one of the following roles:
• A proposer who proposes a new action to the validators;
or
• A validator who validates the proposed actions and shares
the validated result with other validators to determine
whether to accept the proposed action.
For disinterested validation, it is assumed that the proposer
does not engage in validating the proposed action of its own
and all nodes except for the proposer are validators in the RC.
In addition, the system is aware of the number of faulty nodes
F (≤ N), which can be learned from past consensus rounds.
To delve into the fundamentals of co-designing consensus
and communication protocols, hereafter we focus on a single
proposed action and its consensus process operated over wire-
less channels with frequency bandwidth B. We believe that
our key findings are applicable for multiple proposed actions
with minor modifications, e.g., by incorporating orthogonal
frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA) with the con-
ventional Listen-Before-Talk method or distributed spectrum
access (DSA) with the Consensus-Before-Talk algorithm in
our prior work [13].
A. Operational Structure of RC
The RC operates using either the gossip or broadcast
communication protocol, as visualized in Fig. 2. For both the
cases, there are four operational phases:
Phase 1 (Action Proposal) Suppose node p ∈ N is a proposer
and denote the action proposed by the proposer p as Ap. In
addition, define the set of validators as Vp = N\{p}, which
means that all nodes except for the proposer are validators. In
this phase, the proposer becomes a source and the validators
become destinations from a communication perspective. The
proposer first selects a vacant frequency band of bandwidth B
and initiates the RC by disseminating a signed action proposal
message
[Mproposal(Ap,Vp)]p = [Ap, T (Ap)p, S(Vp)]p, (6)
where the message is a tuple of the proposed action Ap, the
absolute time when the action is proposed T (Ap)p and the
randomly chosen sequence of validator indices S(Vp), which
inform the validators of the committing order of the validated
results in Phase 3. Note that the dissemination time duration
given to proposer p is wp time slots.
Phase 2 (Local Validation) After receiving the proposed
action, each validator goes through a local validation of the
proposed action based on information stored at the distributed
ledger. A validator determines that the proposed action is
locally valid if the action does not contradict with other valid
actions already stored in the ledger, or locally invalid if not.
The double spend problem in a crypto-currency system can
be a good example for the contradiction between the newly
5Bob
Carol
David
Aa
Alice
local
validation
local
validation
local
validation
[Aa, 0, 2-3-4]a
[0, 3]d
[1, 2]c
[1, 1]b
commit message : [local validity, timestamp]
action proposal message : [proposed action, proposed time, commit order]
global
validation
global
validation
global
validation
global
validation
Phase 1 Phase 3
time
Phase 2
Globally 
valid.
Validated at 
2.
(in average)
Phase 4
consensus
(a)
Aa
local
validation
local
validation
local
validation
[Aa, 0, 2-3-4]a
[0, 3]d
[1, 2]c
[1, 1]b
global
validation
global
validation
global
validation
global
validation
Globally 
valid.
Validated at 
2.
(in average)
consensus
Phase 1 Phase 3 Phase 4
time
Phase 2
Bob
Carol
David
Alice
(b)
Fig. 2. Examples of the RC with (a) gossip and (b) broadcast
protocols in the network composed of 4 nodes (Alice, Bob, Carol
and David), where Alice is the proposer and the rest are validators.
proposed action and the existing actions. The local validity of
the proposed action Ap determined by validator node v ∈ Vp
is denoted by V (Ap)v , which is the binary information that
takes 1 if locally valid, and 0 if locally invalid. The validator
also records a timestamp when it finishes the local validation
of the proposed action, and the timestamp recorded at node
v is denoted by T (Ap)v . Timestamps of the same proposed
action may differ in distinct validator nodes depending on the
message dissemination method, channel condition and local
computing time.
Phase 3 (Commit) After the local validation, the validators
disseminate commit messages by taking turns with a Round
Robin time-division approach. The committing order is in-
formed by the proposer and is specified in S(Vp) of the action
proposal message. Note that in this phase, the committing
validator node becomes a source and the rest of the nodes,
i.e., the other validators and the proposer, become destinations.
When it is node v’s turn to commit, the node disseminates a
signed commit message
[Mcommit,v(Ap)]v = [V (Ap)v, T (Ap)v]v. (7)
The dissemination time duration of the commit message given
to validator v is wv time slots for all v ∈ Vp. We assume that
the dissemination of the commit messages are done over the
same frequency band of which is used for the action proposal.
Phase 4 (Global Validation and Action Ordering) When each
validator collects more than N − F local validations on the
proposed action received from distinct validators, it determines
the global validity of the proposed action based on the majority
rule. Namely, if there are more collected votes on locally valid
than the votes on locally invalid, then the validator determines
the proposed action to be globally valid and vice versa. On
the one hand, if every node is non-faulty, then the collected
votes on the local validity will be either all locally valid or all
locally invalid. On the other hand, if there are F faulty nodes
that can harm the global validity of the proposed action, as
long as the condition N > 3F holds, the system is resilient
against the faulty nodes [8].
The globally valid actions are the candidates of the actions
that will be recorded on the distributed ledgers. Although the
majority of validators vote on locally valid for the proposed
action, we must focus on the fact that the validated time of
the proposed action may differ at distinct validator nodes.
This in turn may cause asynchrony on the order of valid
actions between the distinct distributed ledgers, if there are
multiple actions that are undergoing consensus processes at
similar time frame. Accordingly, the validators should also
reach consensus on the order of the globally valid actions,
based on the collected timestamps. Particularly in the RC, each
validator takes the average of the collected timestamps and if
all the timestamps are correctly received, the validators will
get the consensual timestamp of the proposed action, which is
denoted by
C(Ap,Vp) = 1|Vp|
∑
v∈Vp
T (Ap)v. (8)
The order of the valid actions are organized based on the
consensual timestamps. Note that due to the reorganization of
the valid actions based on the timestamps, there might be some
contradictory actions that might violate the causal relation
of the actions. Such troublesome actions are unaccepted and
announced to be retried later on or discarded.
B. E2E Latency of RC
As defined earlier, E2E latency is the time interval from the
action proposal to the global validation and action ordering.
In order to focus on the impact of wireless communication,
we assume that the local computation load is relatively small
compared to the local computation capability and thus the local
computing time is negligibly small. Then the E2E latency of
the RC is obtained as
LRC = τ
N+1∑
i=1
wi, (9)
with a communication success probability larger than or equal
to ζN+1, for some 0 ≤ ζ < 1. Note that (9) comes because a
single round of the RC consists of N+1 turns of independent
message dissemination opportunities. The terms wi and ζ
come from (5).
1) Gossip-based RC : In the gossip-based RC, sources
disseminate messages to destinations via the gossip protocol
described in Sec. II-B. In the considering square network
composed of N + 1, the E2E latency of the gossip-based RC
is lower bounded as follows.
6Proposition 1. The E2E latency of the gossip-based RC can
be lower bounded as
LRC,g≥
{
(3
√
N+1−2)(N+1)−√N+1
2 τ, for odd
√
N+1,
(3
√
N+1−2)(N+1)
2 τ, for even
√
N+1.
(10)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
Note that the bound (10) is tight with guaranteeing the target
dissemination success probability approximately equals to ζ ≈
1, if the SNR outage probability of communication between
the neighbors is sufficiently small.
2) Broadcast-based RC: In the broadcast-based RC,
sources disseminate messages to destinations via the broadcast
protocol described in Sec. II-B. In the considered network
model, we have the following E2E latency of the broadcast-
based RC.
Proposition 2. The E2E latency of the broadcast-based RC is
LRC,b =
N+1∑
i=1

log
(
1−ζ 1N
)
log i,max
 τ, (11)
with an overall communication success probability larger than
ζN+1, for 0 ≤ ζ < 1, where i,max denotes the maximum
among all SNR outage probabilities between node i and all
the other nodes.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix B.
Similar to the gossip protocol, for sufficiently small i,max,
the dissemination outage probability will approach to zero.
Note that the lower bounds of E2E latency for the RC obtained
in Propositions 1 and 2 will be compared with the closed-form
expression of the E2E latency of the proposed R2C in the next
section.
IV. PROPOSED: RANDOM REPRESENTATIVE
CONSENSUS (R2C)
In this section, we propose the random representative con-
sensus (R2C) protocol which reduces the E2E consensus
latency while guaranteeing a target reliability. As discussed in
Q1, too many validators incur long consensus latency, whereas
too small validators hinder the consensus reliability. Balancing
between latency and reliability, the R2C seeks the minimum
number of validators to achieve a target reliability, thereby
reducing the consensus latency, as elaborated in the following
subsections.
A. Operational Structure of R2C
For a given proposer node p, we assume N˜ representative
nodes out of N nodes act as a validator, while the other N −
N˜ nodes act as acceptors, who do not validate the proposed
actions, but only aggregate the validated results and determine
whether to accept or reject the proposed action.
The R2C operations follow the same procedures of the RC
in Sec. III, except for the following changes at each phase.
Phase 1 (Action Proposal) At first, the proposer p uniformly
and randomly selects N˜ representative validators from the
set Vp. We define the chosen representative subset as V˜p.
Then the proposer initiates the consensus protocol by dissem-
inating the action proposal message [Mproposal(Ap, V˜p)]p =
[Ap, T (Ap)p, S(V˜p)]p to the network.
Phase 2 (Local Validation) Unlike the RC, the local validation
is only done by the members of V˜p in the R2C.
Phase 3 (Commit) The members in V˜p take turn to commit the
validated results based on the commit order S(V˜p) informed
by the proposer. The results are delivered to all members
including the proposer, validators and acceptors.
Phase 4 (Global Validation and Action Ordering) All members
including the proposer, validators, and acceptors go through
a global validation process, as in the RC based on the
majority rule. The global validation is based on the locally
validated results delivered from the representative validators.
The consensual timestamp of the R2C is
C(Ap, V˜p) = 1|V˜p|
∑
v∈V˜p
T (Ap)v. (12)
Due to its missing set of validators compared to the RC,
the reliability of the R2C should be more carefully examined.
For this reason, we study the resilience of the R2C against
faulty nodes and its robustness against missing validators in
the following subsections.
B. Resiliency of R2C
Against F faulty nodes, the baseline RC becomes resilient
if the number N of validators satisfies N > 3F [8]. Likewise,
the R2C becomes resilient if the number N˜ of representative
validators satisfies N˜ > 3F˜ . Due to the randomly selected rep-
resentatives, the resilience of the R2C is guaranteed stochas-
tically. For the resilience outage probability α, the definition
of resilience for the R2C is described as below.
Definition 1. For a fixed number of representatives N˜ and a
random number of faulty representative nodes F˜ , the R2C is
α-resilient if
Pr[N˜ > 3F˜ ] ≥ α, (13)
for a target resiliency probability α where 0 < α ≤ 1.
Next, we characterize the minimum number of representa-
tive validators for achieving α-resiliency. Since the represen-
tatives are chosen uniformly by the proposer, N˜ is a random
variable which follows the hypergeometric distribution, of
which probability mass function is given by
Pr[F˜ = f ] =
(
F
f
)(N−F
N˜−f
)(
N
N˜
) ,∀f ∈ {0, . . . , F}. (14)
Accordingly, the resiliency outage probability can be equiv-
alently expressed as (15), where 3F2[·] is the generalized
hypergeometric function.
A straightforward way of obtaining the condition on N˜
for α-resiliency is to compute the inverse function of (15),
however, since it includes a hypergeometric function, it is less
tractable. Alternatively, we can take advantage of the fact that
the hypergeometric distribution can be approximated to the
normal distribution when N˜ is sufficiently large, N and F are
7large compared to N˜ , and FN is not close to 0 or 1. Thus, from
the normal approximation, (15) yields
Pr
[
F˜ <
N˜
3
]
≈ 1
2
[
1 + erf
(
N˜
3 − µF˜ − φ
σF˜
√
2
)]
, (16)
where erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt is the error function, µF˜ =
FN˜
N
and σF˜ =
√
FN˜
N
N−F
N
N−N˜
N−1 are the mean and standard devi-
ation of the hypergeometric random variable F˜ , respectively,
and φ (0 < φ < 1) is the correction factor that comes from the
approximation of the probability function of a discrete random
variable to a continuous random variable. In [27], [28], an
approximation for the error function erf(x), whose derivation
is based on a generalization of Hermite-Pade approximation,
is given as
erf(x) ≈ g(x) =
[
1− e−x2
4
pi
+ax2
1+ax2
] 1
2
, x ≥ 0, (17)
where the constant a ≈ 0.14 is chosen to achieve a relative
precision better than 0.004 uniformly for all real x ≥ 0.
For x < 0, the identity erf(−x) = −erf(x) can be used.
Note that the approximated error function g(x) in (17) can be
easily inverted analytically as (18). Therefore, we approximate
the inverse of the error function as erf−1(x) ≈ g−1(x).
Note that for the range of −1 < x ≤ 0, the identity
erf−1(x) = −erf−1(x) can also be used. In Fig. 3, we com-
pare the resiliency probabilities obtained from two different
approaches, i.e., the original hypergeometric distribution and
approximant with approximated error function. As shown in
the figure, the approximation is tight for different number
of faulty nodes F and the number of random representative
validators N˜ . Resultingly, N˜ that approximately achieves α-
resiliency of the R2C as follows.
Proposition 3. α-resiliency of the R2C can be approximately
achieved if the number of representatives N˜ satisfies the
following condition
N˜ > Nα, (19)
where Nα =
φA+BN+
√
2φABN−2φ2B+B2N2
A2+2B , A =
1
3− FN and
B = F (N−F )(N−1)N2 (g
−1(2α− 1))2.
Proof: From (16) and (17), we have the condition
1
2
(
1 + g
(
N˜/3− µF˜ − φ
σF˜
√
2
))
≥ α, (20)
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Fig. 3. Illustration of resiliency probability versus the number of
representative validators obtained from hypergeometric and approxi-
mated normal approach, when N = 80 and F = 5, 15, 25.
achieving α-resiliency. By rearranging this to satisfy the
condition for N˜ , we have (19).
Note that Nα depends on N , F , and α. Thus, the number
of random representative validators can be easily chosen to
achieve α-resilience if we have the knowledge of N and F .
C. Robustness
We also seek for the condition that ensures the robustness of
the R2C against missing validators, especially by measuring
the gap between the consensual timestamps of the valid actions
in the R2C and that of the RC. We first define a consensus
distortion function [29] as
|D(Ap,Vp, V˜p)| = |C(Ap,Vp)− C(Ap, V˜p)|, (21)
which measures the absolute difference between the RC con-
sensual timestamp C(Ap,Vp) in (8) and the R2C consensual
timestamp C(Ai, V˜p) in (12). Both C(Ap,Vp) and C(Ap, V˜p)
are random values, where the randomness of C(Ap,Vp) is due
to the channel uncertainty and that of C(Ap, V˜p) comes from
the randomly chosen representative validator set as well as
the channel uncertainty. Intuitively, if the distortion is small,
it means that the representatives are well representing the
consensual timestamp of the entire network, so that the valid
action ordering by the random representative validators will
be the same as the ordering done by the all the participants in
Pr
[
F˜ <
N˜
3
]
= 1−
( N˜⌈
N˜
3
⌉)( N−N˜
F−
⌈
N˜
3
⌉)(
N
F
) 3F2
 1,
⌈
N˜
3
⌉
− F ,
⌈
N˜
3
⌉
− N˜⌈
N˜
3
⌉
+ 1, N +
⌈
N˜
3
⌉
+ 1− F − N˜
; 1
, (15)
g−1(x) =
− 2
pia
− log(1− x
2)
2
+
√(
2
pia
+
log(1− x2)
2
)2
− 1
a
log(1− x2)
 12 , 0 ≤ x < 1. (18)
8the network. On the other hand, if the distortion is large, the
ordering of the valid actions by the representatives might be
different to that done by all nodes. In this context, we define
(β, γ)-robustness of the R2C as follows.
Definition 2. The R2C is (β, γ)-robust if
Pr[|D(Ap,Vp, V˜p)| ≤ β] ≥ γ, (22)
for an acceptable consensus distortion β, where β ≥ 0, and
target robustness probability γ, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
Note that the number of validators should be sufficiently large,
in order to ensure the distortion smaller than β. Again, we
seek for the condition of N˜ that guarantees (β, γ)-robustness
of the R2C. A straightforward way of obtaining the condition
is to derive the exact distribution of D(Ap,Vp, V˜p). However,
as mentioned before, D(Ap,Vp, V˜p) is a jointly distributed
random variable, where the randomness comes from the ran-
dom selection of the representative set V˜p and the number of
transmissions required for the successful information delivery,
so the distribution is complicated and hard to express in a
tractable form.
Alternatively, we approximate D(Ap,Vp, V˜p) as a normal
distribution with zero mean and variance σ2D. A justification
of the normal approximation is as follows. First, assume that
all nodes determine that the proposed action is valid, that is
V (Ap)v = 1 for all v ∈ Vp. Then, we can write
D(Ap,Vp, V˜p) = 1
N
∑
i∈Vp
T (Ap)i − 1
N˜p
∑
j∈V˜p
T (Ap)j . (23)
Consequently, for a given some realization T (Ap)v = tv for
all v ∈ Vi, the consensual timestamp of the RC is defined as
C(Ap,Vp) | T and given by C(Ap,Vp) | T = 1N
∑
v∈Vp tv
which can be seen as a population mean over a set T = {tv |
v ∈ Vp}. On the other hand, the consensual timestamp of the
R2C C(Ap, V˜p) | T = 1N˜p
∑
v∈V˜p tv is a sample mean where
the samples are chosen over the set T without replacement.
It is known that from the Central Limit Theorem (CLT),
C(Ap,Vp) | T − C(Ap, V˜p) | T follows normal distribution
if the population of the T is infinite. Although we assume
finite N , Fig. 4 shows that the approximation is quite tight so
long as N is sufficiently large. Thus, we have
Pr[|D(Ai,Vi, V˜i)| ≤ β] ≈ erf
(
β
σD
√
2
)
. (24)
Approximating the inverse error function via (18), we provide
the following proposition.
Proposition 4. For a given location of the proposer and the
message dissemination method, the variance of D(Ap,Vp, V˜p)
is
σ2D =
τ2(N − N˜)
N˜N2
ψ, (25)
and the necessary number of representatives for (β, γ)-
robustness is
N˜ > N(β,γ), (26)
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Fig. 4. Bound on the consensus failure probability due to time
stamp distortion vs. the number of random representative validators
N˜ , obtained from empirical experiment, normal and approximated
normal approaches, when N = 80 and β = 0.5, 1, 2.
where ψ =
∑
v∈Vp
(
E[Z2pv] +
1
N−1
∑
j∈Vp,j 6=v E[Zpv]E[Zpj ]
)
,
N(β,γ) =
[
1
N +
β2N
2τ2(g−1(γ))2ψ
]−1
, and Zpv is the number of
transmissions required for successful message delivery from
node p to v.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix C.
Unlike the condition for the α-resiliency, N(β,γ) is depen-
dent not only on N , F , β and γ, but also on the the location
of the proposer p. Also note that the message disseminating
method affects the term ψ, thus we write N(β,γ),g and N(β,γ),b
for the gossip and broadcast protocols in the R2C, respectively.
D. E2E Latency of α-Resilient and (β, γ)-Robust R2C
From Propositions 3 and 4, we approximately achieve α-
resiliency and (β, γ)-robustness by the R2C when the number
of random representative validators satisfy
N˜ ≥ max (Nα, N(β,γ)) , (27)
for the given proposer p. Meanwhile, since the validators are
chosen randomly by the proposer, the consensus latency will
vary depending on the chosen validator set. Thus, for the given
proposer p, the expected consensus latency of the R2C is
obtained as
LR2C =
wp,ζ + N˜
N
∑
v∈Vp
wv,ζ
 τ, (28)
with communication success probability larger than ζN˜+1,
where wp and wv are the dissemination time duration as
discussed in Sec. II-B, and N˜N is from the marginalization
taken over all possible representatives subset V˜p ⊂ Vp and
|V˜p| = N˜ .
91) Gossip-based R2C: Now we find the number of valida-
tors N˜ that achieves α-resiliency and (β, γ)-robustness in the
gossip-based R2C to obtain E2E latency for given proposer p.
Suppose the proposer p proposes an action Ap at time T (Ap)p
and since we are assuming a negligible local computation
time at each node, the timestamp of the proposed action at
a validator node v ∈ Vp can be expressed as
T (Ap)g,v = T (Ap)p + τZg,pv, (29)
where Zg,pv is the random variable that denotes the number
of time slots required for delivery of a message from node p
to node v. From (8), the consensual timestamp of Ap in the
gossip-based RC can be expressed as
C(Ap,Vp)g = T (Ap)p + τ
N
∑
v∈Vp
Zg,pv (30)
≈ T (Ap)p + τ
N
∑
v∈Vp
epv, (31)
and the consensual timestamp in the gossip-based R2C can be
expressed as
C(Ap, V˜p)g ≈ T (Ap)p + τ
N˜
∑
v∈V˜p
epv, (32)
where V˜p is the random representative validators set and epv
is the number of edges of the shortest paths from node p to v
as defined in Appendix A.
From Proposition 4, we can show that the number of
representatives in the gossip-based R2C must be no smaller
than
N(β,γ),g =
[
1
N
+
βN
2τ2(g−1(γ))2ψg
]−1
, (33)
where ψg varies depending on the location of the proposer
node p to achieve (β, γ)-robustness.
For instance, if the proposer is located at the corner point
of the network, we have
ψcorg =
(N+1)((13N−24√N+1 + 16)N+12(√N+1−1))
6(N − 1) ,
(34)
and if the proposer is located at the center point of the network,
we have
ψceng =
(13N2 − 4N − 8)N
24(N − 1) . (35)
The number of representatives for α-resiliency and (β, γ)-
robustness in the gossip-based R2C must satisfy N˜ ≥
max(Nα, N(β,γ),g) where Nα is fixed number for given N ,
F and α as mentioned in Sec. IV-B. We can also derive the
E2E latency of the gossip-based R2C as follows.
Proposition 5. The E2E latency of the gossip-based R2C is
lower bounded as (36), if the proposer is located at the corner
point of the network and
LcenR2C,g ≥
[(
3
2
√
N + 1− 1
)
N˜ +
√
N + 1− 1
]
τ, (37)
if the proposer is located at the center point of the network.
Proof: The results follow from the proof of Proposition
1 in Appendix A with (28).
Similar to the bound (10), the bounds (36) and (37) are tight
if the SNR outage probability of a communication between
two neighbors is sufficiently small.
2) Broadcast-based R2C: Suppose the proposer p starts
disseminating the action proposal message at time T (Ap)p.
Then the timestamp of the proposed action at validator v ∈ V˜p
is
T (Ap)b,v = T (Ap)p + τZb,pv. (38)
Assuming that V (Ap)v = 1, ∀v ∈ Vp, the consensual
timestamp of the proposed action Ap in the RC with the
broadcasting is
C(Ap,Vp)b = T (Ap)p + τ
N
∑
v∈Vp
Zb,pv. (39)
Similarly, the consensual timestamp in the R2C with the
broadcasting can be expressed as
C(Ap, V˜p)b = T (Ap)p + τ
N˜
∑
v∈Vp
Zb,pv. (40)
For (β, γ)-robustness, the number of representatives in the
broadcast-based R2C must be no smaller than
N(β,γ),b =
[
1
N
+
β2N
2τ2(g−1(γ))2ψb
]−1
, (41)
where ψb=
∑
v∈Vp
(
1+pv
(1−pv)2+
1
N−1
∑
j∈Vp,j 6=v
1
(1−pv)(1−pj)
)
.
Thus, the number of representatives for the α-resiliency
and (β, γ)-robustness in the broadcast-based R2C must satisfy
N˜ ≥ max(Nα, N(β,γ),b). Moreover, we can derive the E2E
latency of the broadcast-based R2C as follows.
Proposition 6. The E2E latency of the broadcast-based R2C
is
LR2C,b=
N˜
N
∑
i∈Vp

log
(
1−ζ 1N
)
log i,max
+

log
(
1−ζ 1N
)
log p,max

 τ,
(42)
with a communication success probability greater than or
equal to ζN˜+1.
Proof: The results follow from the proof of Proposition
2 in Appendix B with (9).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the performance
of the RC and the R2C, and validate the analytic results
obtained in the previous sections. Taking into account of the
communications between IoT devices, e.g., devices equipped
with Bluetooth-based transceivers, we fix the transmit power
at each node for the gossip and the broadcast transmissions
as Pg,t = 2.5 mW and Pb,t = 100 mW, respectively, and
the noise power as Pnoise = 10−10 mW. For fair comparison,
we simulate and compare the total energy consumption for
accepting a single proposed action in the consensus protocols
under study. In addition, we set the distance between the
10
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Fig. 5. The E2E latency of the RC and R2C with gossip (G) and
broadcast (B) transmissions versus target resiliency probability α,
when F = 5, 25.
two neighboring nodes to be R = 10 meters and the target
dissemination success probability to be ζ = 0.9999. We also
fix the path loss exponent as η = 3, which usually ranges
between 2.7 − 3.5 for urban outdoor scenarios and between
1.6 − 3.3 for indoor scenarios [21]. Moreover, from Friis
equation, we assume PLdB(R0) = 20 log10
λ
4piR0
and for the
simulation we fix R0 = 1 meter and λ = 0.125 meters, from
the industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) radio bands at 2.4
GHz.
Fig. 5 illustrates the E2E latency of the RC and R2C with
the gossip (denoted by (G)) and broadcast (denoted by (B))
transmissions with respect to the target resiliency probability
α. From the figure, we can easily see the trade-off between the
latency and the resiliency of the R2C. For achieving α close to
1, the number of representative validators N˜ in the R2C must
be as large as N . Another interesting feature is that when
utilizing broadcast transmission, the increment of E2E latency
is smaller than that of the gossip protocol. This reveals the
broadcast transmission enables low latency consensus while
guaranteeing a small loss of resiliency against faulty nodes.
Fig. 6a and 6b illustrate the E2E latency of the RC and
R2C with the gossip and broadcast transmissions with respect
to the acceptable consensus distortion and target robustness
probability, respectively, when the proposer is located at the
corner and center, with N+1 = 81 and the target SNR ρ = 10
dB. In Fig. 6a, we can see that as the acceptable consensus
distortion gets smaller, the R2C incur larger delay since it
requires a larger number of representative validators. The R2C
jointly designed with broadcast transmission outperforms other
designs in terms of achieving low E2E latency with small
acceptable distortion. Similarly, in Fig. 6b, co-design of the
R2C with broadcast transmission can achieve the lowest E2E
latency, while guaranteeing robustness more than any other
approaches.
Fig. 7a and 7b illustrate the E2E latency and corresponding
normalized energy consumption versus the number of faulty
nodes F , respectively, of the RC and R2C with the gossip and
broadcast transmissions when the proposer is located at the
corner and the center point of the network, respectively. The
reliability factors are fixed to α = 0.01, β = 1, and γ = 0.1.
As shown in Fig. 7a, the E2E latency of the R2C is relatively
lower than that of the RC, while the R2C with broadcast-based
message dissemination can further reduce latency better than
using the gossip approach. Note that for small number of faulty
nodes, the dominant factor that determines the E2E latency
of the R2C becomes guaranteeing (β, γ)-robustness, while
for large number of faulty nodes, guaranteeing α-resiliency
is the dominant factor. In the mean time, Fig. 7b shows
that the total energy consumption is much larger when using
broadcast approach in the RC, however, if there are small
number of faulty nodes in the network, the R2C with broadcast
transmission can dramatically reduce energy consumption.
Finally, Fig. 8 illustrates the total number of nodes in the
network versus the number of required validators achieving
α = 0.99, β = 1, γ = 0.9 in the gossip-based and broadcast-
based R2C. The network size is fixed to 10,000 square-meters
for ensuring direct communications between two nodes located
farthest apart. One out of ten nodes is assumed to be a faulty
node, so the number of faulty nodes in the network is ten
percent. As shown in the figure, the number of validators
required in the gossip-based R2C linearly grows as the total
number of nodes grows. However, the number of required
validators converges to a constant number as the total number
of nodes grows. This means that the broadcast-based R2C is
scalable and can support as many nodes as possible while
using a small number of validators.
VI. CONCLUSION
Towards supporting mission-critical and real-time controls
in distributed systems, we proposed a novel communication-
efficient distributed consensus protocol, i.e., Random Repre-
sentative Consensus (R2C). For both the gossip and broadcast
transmissions, we derived the closed-form expressions of the
E2E latency and reliability of the R2C. These expressions
bear fundamental relationships between consensus latency and
reliability under wireless connectivity, thereby providing a
guideline on co-designing distributed consensus and wireless
communication protocols. The effectiveness of the R2C was
validated numerically and theoretically, for two different net-
work topologies assuming uniformly distributed faulty nodes.
LcorR2C,g ≥

[(
3
√
N+1
2
−
√
N+1−1
N
− 1
)
N˜ + 2(
√
N + 1− 1)
]
τ, for odd
√
N + 1,[(
3
√
N+1
2
−
√
N+1−2
2N
− 1
)
N˜ + 2(
√
N + 1− 1)
]
τ, for even
√
N + 1,
(36)
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Fig. 6. The E2E latency of the R2C with gossip and broadcast transmissions versus (a) the target robustness probability (γ) with fixed
acceptable consensus distortion (β = 1), and (b) the target robustness probability (γ) with fixed acceptable consensus distortion (β = 1).
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Corner & Center
(a)
0 5 10 15 20 25
0
10
20
30
40
50
Corner & Center
(b)
Fig. 7. (a) The E2E latency and (b) normalized energy consumption versus the number of faulty nodes F of the RC, and 0.99-resilience
and (1, 0.9)-robustness R2C with gossip and broadcast transmissions.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Consider a message delivery from an arbitrary source node
i to destination node k, where i, k ∈ N , i 6= k, and k is
not necessarily be a neighbor of node i. In graph theory, a
walk is a finite or infinite sequence of edges which join a
sequence of nodes and a path is a walk in which all nodes and
vertices are distinct. In this perspective, a route of the message
delivery from node i to k can be seen as a path between the
two nodes. A single message may flow over various paths,
while we focus on the one with the shortest amount of time
upon all successful message delivery. Let Zg,ik be a random
variable which denotes the least number of time slots required
to deliver a message from source i to destination k via the
gossip method. Among all the possible paths for the message
flow, we define the shortest paths as the paths which are
comprised of the minimum number of edges. We also define
the number of edges comprising the shortest paths between
the node i and k as eik and the number of shortest paths
between the two nodes as sik. Intuitively, the shortest paths
are the dominant factors that determines Zg,ik, if there are
sufficiently large number of independent shortest paths from
node i to node k. Furthermore, a convergence of Zg,ik to eik
if sik →∞ is intuitive trivial, since at least one shortest path
without any outage will exist among sik shortest paths.
Lemma 1. Given a source-destination node pair (i, k), the
random variable Zg,ik converges in distribution to a constant
random variable as
Pr [Zg,ik = z] =
{
1, z = eik
0, elsewhere.
(43)
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Fig. 8. The total number of nodes in the network versus the number
of required validators for achieving α = 0.99, β = 1, γ = 0.9 in the
gossip-based and broadcast-based R2C.
if the shortest paths do not have any internal edge in common,
i.e., edge-independent, and sik →∞.
Proof: The outage probability of a single hop communi-
cation between two neighbors can be written as
g = 1− exp
(
−10PLdB(R0)10 ρ Pn
Pg,t
(
R
R0
)η)
, (44)
from (4). Suppose there exist sik shortest paths between node i
and k and let T1, . . . , Tsik be the random variables that denote
the number of transmissions required for a successful message
delivery over those shortest paths. Then, we can model Ts
as a random variable which follows the negative binomial
distribution as
Pr [Ts = t] =
{(
t−1
eik−1
)
t−eikg (1− g)eik , t ≥ eik,
0, t < eik.
(45)
for s ∈ {1, . . . , sik}, where t is a non-negative integer.
Let Uik be a random variable which denotes the minimum
number of transmissions for successful message delivery from
node i to node k, over all the paths from node i to node k
excluding the shortest paths. We assume that Uik is following
some p.m.f. Pr[Uik = u], which is obviously Pr[Uik = u] = 0
for u ≤ eik, since no paths without the shortest paths can
deliver a message with less than or equal to eik transmissions.
Then we can write
Zg,ik = min{T1, . . . , Tsik , Uik}, (46)
where the random variables T1, T2, . . . , Tsik are identically
and independently distributed following p.m.f. of the negative
binomial distribution (45) with parameter eik. Then the cu-
mulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of Zg,ik can be derived
as
Pr [Zg,ik≤z]=1− Pr [Zg,ik > z] (47)
=1− Pr [min{T1, . . . , Tsik , Uik} > z] (48)
=1− Pr [T1 > z, . . . , Tsik > z,Uik > z] (49)
=1−(1−Pr[Uik ≤ z]) (1−Pr[Ts ≤ z])sik ,
(50)
where (50) follows from the assumption that all the paths
are independent. If there exist a sufficiently large number of
shortest paths, i.e., sik →∞, we have
lim
sik→∞
Pr[Zg,ik ≤ z] =
{
0, z < eik,
1, z ≥ eik,
(51)
since Pr[Uik ≤ z] = 0 and Pr[Ts ≤ z] = 0 for z < eik, and
0 < Pr[Ts ≤ z] < 1 for z ≤ eik. From (50), we also have
Pr[Zg,ik = z] = (Pr[Zg,ik ≤ z]− Pr[Zg,ik ≤ z − 1]) . (52)
Thus, from (51) we have (43) and this completes the proof of
Lemma 1.
Put differently, if there are infinitely many edge-independent
shortest paths from the node i to k, there may exist at least one
path that can guarantee a successful message delivery from the
node i to k without occurring any outages during the delivery.
In fact, the total number of shortest paths sik is finite and the
number of shortest paths that are edge-independent is much
smaller than sik. Therefore, the random variable Zg,ik can be
lower bounded as
Zg,ik ≥ eik, (53)
in the considered network model. From (53), we can also
conclude that
wi,ζ ≥ max
k
eik, (54)
for all i ∈ N . For small g , the bound (54) tight. For
sufficiently small g , we approximately get
Pr
[
max
k
Zg,ik > max
k
eik
]
≈ 0. (55)
In the mean time, in the square network considered in this
paper, the number of edges that comprises shortest paths is
eik = x˜ik + y˜ik, where x˜ik = |xk − xi|/R and y˜ik = |xk −
yi|/R, and from simple combinatorics the number of shortest
paths between the two nodes can be readily derived as sik =
(x˜ik+y˜ik)!
x˜ik!y˜ik!
. Since we assume square network composed of N+
1 nodes, and from (54) and (9), we have (10).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Let Zb,ik be a random variable which denotes the number
of time slots required to deliver a message from source node i
to destination node k via the broadcast protocol. In this case,
messages are delivered in a single hop without any help from
relays. Since the messages are sent repeatedly until successful
delivery, the random variable Zb,ik follows the geometric
distribution with p.d.f.
Pr[Zb,ik = z] =
{
z−1ik (1− ik) , ∀z ≥ 1
0, elsewhere,
(56)
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where ik = Pr [SNRik < ρ] is the SNR outage probability
(4) with transmit power Pt = Pt,b. Then the dissemination
outage probability can be upper bounded as
Pr
[
max
k
Zb,ik > wi,ζ
]
= 1− Pr
[
max
k
Zb,ik ≤ wi
]
(57)
= 1−
∏
k∈N ,k 6=i
Pr [Zb,ik ≤ wi] (58)
= 1−
∏
k∈N ,k 6=i
(1− wiik ) (59)
≤ 1− (1− wii,max)N , (60)
where i,max = 1 − exp
(
−10PLdB(R0)10 ρPnPt
(
maxk Rik
R0
)η)
is
the SNR outage probability between node i and the node
located maximum distance apart from node i. The equality
(58) holds from the independence of the channels between the
source and the destinations, and the inequality (60) holds from
the fact that the SNR outage probability is the largest when the
node k is located farthest apart from the node i among all the
destinations from (4). Since the dissemination time duration
achieves a dissemination outage probability smaller than ζ, we
have a bound as follows.
Remark 1. In the broadcast method, the dissemination time
duration is bounded as
wi ≥

log
(
1−ζ 1N
)
log i,max
 , (61)
since (60) must be smaller than or equal to ζ from (5).
From Remark 1 and (9), we get (2).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Throughout the proof, we fix a proposer as node p without
loss of generality and use D and Ti instead of D(Ap,Vp, V˜p)
and T (Ap)i from (23), respectively, for simple notation.
We first show that E[D] = 0. Let V˜p ∈
{
V˜p,1, . . . , V˜p,(NN˜)
}
be the randomly chosen validator set by the proposer, where
V˜p,1, . . . , V˜p,(NN˜) be all possible sets of cardnality N˜ that can
be chosen from Vp with equal probability 1/
(
N
N˜
)
. For given
V˜p = V˜p,l, we have
E
[
D | V˜p,l
]
= E
 1
N
∑
i∈Vp
Ti − 1
N˜
∑
j∈V˜p,l
Tj
 (62)
= E
 1
N
∑
i∈V˜cp,l
Ti−N−N˜
N˜N
∑
j∈V˜p,l
Tj
 (63)
=
1
N
∑
i∈V˜ci,l
E[Ti]− N − N˜
N˜N
∑
j∈V˜i,l
E[Tj ], (64)
where V˜ci,l = Vi\V˜i,l is the complement of V˜i,l. By marginal-
izing (64), we have
E[D]=
1(
N
N˜
) (NN˜)∑
l=1
E
[
D | V˜p,l
]
(65)
=
1(
N
N˜
) (NN˜)∑
l=1
 1
N
∑
i∈V˜cp,l
E[Ti]−N−N˜
N˜N
∑
j∈V˜p,l
E[Tj ]
 (66)
=
N−N˜(
N
N˜
)
 1
N
∑
i∈Vp
E[Ti]− 1
N˜N
∑
j∈Vp
N˜E[Tj ]
 (67)
= 0. (68)
From Chebyshev’s inequality, we have
Pr
[
|D| ≥
√
β
]
≤ Var(D)
β
., (69)
where from the law of total variance
Var(D) = E
[
Var
(
D | V˜p
)]
+Var
(
E
[
D | V˜p
])
. (70)
The first term of the right-hand side in (70) can be rewritten
as
E
[
Var
(
D | V˜i
)]
=
1(
N
N˜
) (NN˜)∑
l=1
Var
 1
N
∑
i∈V˜cp,l
Ti − N − N˜
N˜N
∑
j∈V˜p,l
Tj
 (71)
=
1
N2
(
N
N˜
) (NN˜)∑
l=1
 ∑
i∈V˜cp,l
Var(Ti)+
(N−N˜)2
N˜2
∑
j∈V˜p,l
Var(Tj)

(72)
=
1
N2
∑
i∈Vp
(
(N−N˜)
N
Var(Ti) +
N˜(N − N˜)2
N˜2N3
Var(Ti)
)
(73)
=
(N − N˜)
N˜N2
∑
i∈Vp
Var(Ti), (74)
and the second term as
Var
(
E
[
D | V˜i
])
=
1(
N
N˜
) (NN˜)∑
l=1
 1
N
∑
i∈V˜cp,l
E[Ti]−N−N˜
N˜N
∑
j∈V˜p,l
E[Tj ]

2
(75)
=
(N − N˜)
N˜N2
∑
i∈Vp
E[Ti]2− 1
(N−1)
∑
j∈Vp,j 6=i
E[Ti]E[Tj ]
 .
(76)
From (70), (74) and (76), and since Var(Ti) = E[T 2i ] −
E[Ti]
2, we have
Var(D)
=
τ2(N−N˜)
N˜N2
∑
i∈Vp
E[T 2i ]− 1N − 1 ∑
j∈Vp,j 6=i
E[Zi]E[Zj ]
 .
(77)
By substituting (77) into (69), we have (25). This finishes the
proof.
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